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Abstract - Strategic market interaction is modelled as a two-stage game where potential entrants 
choose capacities and active firms compete in prices or quantities. Due to capital indivisibility, the 
capacity choice is made from a finite grid. In either strategic setting, the equilibrium of the game 
depends on the size of total demand at a price equal to the minimum average cost. With a 
sufficiently large market, the long-run competitive price emerges at a subgame-perfect equilibrium 
of either game. Failing the large market condition, equilibrium outcomes are quite different in the 
two games (in contrast to Kreps and Scheinkman), and neither game reproduces the competitive 
equilibrium. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
Since Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) (henceforth, KS) research has remained
active on the issue of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with endogenous ca-
pacity determination. KS have shown that, under the eﬃcient rationing
rule, the Cournot outcome emerges at a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a
duopolistic two-stage capacity and price game. This result may not hold,
though, under alternative rationing rules, where a mixed strategy equilib-
rium of the price subgame can arise on the equilibrium path (Davidson and
Deneckere, 1986). More recently, Madden (1998) has established that a
uniformly elastic demand curve is suﬃcient for the Cournot outcome under
oligopoly, regardless of the rationing rule. Boccard and Wauthy (2000 and
2004) have shown that, while the Cournot result extends to oligopoly under
KS’s assumption on cost and the eﬃcient rationing rule, this need not be
so if, in the short run, the ﬁrms can produce above “capacity” at a ﬁnite
extra-cost.
Throughout this literature the cost of capacity has been represented as
a continuous and convex function. It follows that identical ﬁrms will choose
a strictly positive capacity at an equilibrium of the capacity and price game
(see p. 12 below). Casual observation seems to suggest, though, that there
are markets where some potential entrants refrain from entering, though
equally competitive as active ﬁrms. One natural way to account for such a
feature is by introducing nonconvexities in the long-run cost function. In this
connection, we take the view that, because of capital indivisibility, the ﬁrms
are facing a discrete capacity choice set. This results in discontinuities and
nonconvexities in the long-run cost function and substantial scale economies.
Furthermore, like much literature on Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, we
take the (short-run) average variable cost to be constant up to full capacity
utilization. Based on these assumptions, we analyze a capacity and price
game under the eﬃcient rationing rule. In the main text this task is made
simpler by means of the special assumption that total demand is integer at a
price equal to the minimum average cost. At a subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the game, active ﬁrms are less than (a large number of) potential entrants
a n da ne q u i l i b r i u mo fad i ﬀerent type arises, depending on parameter values.
It turns out that the equilibrium level of total capacity equals the competi-
1Much of this work was made during my visit to the School of Social Sciences, University
of Manchester (UK). I would like to thank partecipants to the Economic Theory Workshop
for valuable comments. I am especially grateful to Paul Madden for his support and
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1tive one - namely, the quantity demanded at a price equal to the minimum
average cost -, with pricing behavior on the equilibrium path depending on
how large is the market compared to the ﬁrm minimum eﬃcient scale: with
as u ﬃciently large market, the competitive price - the minimum average cost
- is charged, otherwise the price subgame has a mixed strategy equilibrium
on the equilibrium path. These results are not fundamentally altered when
the aforementioned special assumption is removed: then the “large market
condition” turns out to be suﬃcient, though not strictly necessary, for a
competitive outcome to be obtained in the capacity and price game.
The paper also analyzes a capacity and quantity game among Cournot
competitors. In the simplest version of the model, competition among
Cournot quantity setters is found to exactly reproduce the competitive equi-
librium so long as total demand at a price equal to the minimum average
cost is suﬃciently large; if not, the ﬁrms produce below capacity on the equi-
librium path and the equilibrium level of total capacity may exceed, even
signiﬁcantly, the competitive one. Similar to the capacity and price game,
t h e“ l a r g em a r k e tc o n d i t i o n ”b e c o m e ss u ﬃcient but not strictly necessary
for the competitive outcome when total demand is not integer at a price
equal to the minimum average cost.
The above results shed further light on the relationship between the out-
comes of price competition, Cournot quantity competition, and the compet-
itive equilibrium. It is a well-established property of price-game equilibrium
under given capacities that, with the average variable cost constant up to
capacity, the (short-run) market-clearing price emerges if each ﬁrm capac-
ity is suﬃciently small compared to industry capacity (see, for example,
Vives, 1986). This result is now extended to the long run: price competi-
tion with endogenous capacity determination will exactly yield the long-run
competitive price when, at the long-run competitive equilibrium, the market
size is suﬃciently large compared to the ﬁrm minimum eﬃcient size. The
analogous result obtained for the capacity and quantity game is worth com-
paring with Novshek’s (1980) model of Cournot competition with entry: in
that model, which is based on a smooth U-shaped average cost curve, the
equilibrium price in the entry and quantity game tends asymptotically to
the minimum average cost as the average cost minimizing output decreases
relative to total demand.
Quite importantly, our model shows how price competition need not
yield the Cournot outcome, even under the eﬃcient rationing rule: on the
equilibrium path of the capacity and price game active ﬁrms may play a
mixed-strategy equilibrium of the price subgame. This possibility arises be-
cause of the discontinuities in the long-run cost function: if the cost function
2were everywhere continuous and convex, then, at any capacity conﬁguration
involving a mixed strategy equilibrium for the price subgame, it would pay
the largest ﬁrm to reduce its capacity, which would reduce cost without
reducing equilibrium revenue.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic assumptions of the model
are laid down in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the capacity and price game,
providing full equilibrium characterization for the special case where total
demand is integer at a price equal to the minimum average cost. Section 4
similarly analyzes a capacity and quantity game among Cournot competi-
tors. Section 5 discusses the role of capacity indivisibility, also showing how
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition would always yield the Cournot outcome
under a (weakly) convex cost function. Section 6 brieﬂy concludes. Proofs of
some of the propositions in the text are located in Appendix A. Appendix B
pursues characterization of equilibria of our capacity and market games for
the more general case where total demand is not integer at a price equal to
the minimum average cost. Appendix C deals with a simultaneous capacity
and quantity game among Cournot competitors.
2 The model and basic assumptions
We consider the market of a homogeneous product. D(p) and P(Q) denote
the demand and the inverse demand function, respectively, p being the price
and Q the total quantity. We assume a linear demand curve, P(Q)=a−bQ
for Q ≤ a/b, where a,b > 0. A ts t a g e1t h e r ei sas e tZ = {1,...,z} of
identical potential entrants that make capacity decisions, while active ﬁrms
compete in the output market at stage 2. To be active, ﬁrm i must install
some positive capacity qi at stage 1. Capacity is chosen from a ﬁnite grid,
due to indivisibility of capital and ﬁniteness of available technologies. Let
F+ = {f} with f =0 ,1,2,...,a n dl e tR+ be the set of nonnegative reals.
To keep the analysis most simple, availability of a single technology (α)
is assumed throughout, except that a clue will also be given as to how the
analysis could be generalized under a plurality of technologies. The capacity
choice set faced by each ﬁrm is taken to be C(α) = αF+, where α ∈ R+.
The cost of capacity per unit of output is constant at r under full capacity
utilization. We let α =1 , that is, we set equal to 1 the minimum positive
capacity that is technically feasible with technology α; consequently, the
capacity choice set is F+.
Given qi, ﬁrm i’s cost is thus c(qi)=rqi for qi ≤ qi (we set equal
to 0 the (constant) unit variable cost), while no output can be produced
3above capacity (or, equivalently, c(qi)=∞ for qi > qi). Clearly the long-
run cost function, C(qi) - showing the minimum cost at any output - is
C(qi)=rqi, with qi =[ qi,q i+1)∩F+ for any qi ∈ R+. Thus the C(qi) curve
is horizontal at any qi ∈ (f,f+1],a n dj u m p su pb yr units at any f.C l e a r l y
C(qi) is not everywhere (weakly) convex.2 The long-run average cost curve,
AC(qi)=r
qi
qi,s l o p e sd o w n w a r d sf o rqi ∈ (f, f +1 ](scale economies due to
capacity indivisibility), equals r for any qi ∈ F+ (constant returns at full
capacity), and jumps up when qi slightly rises above f (the jump converging
to zero as f →∞ ). Clearly, minargminqi AC(qi)=1 : the lowest average-
cost minimizing output is just the minimum feasible capacity.
A (by assumption) deterministic capacity choice is made by each i ∈ Z to
maximize the expectation of proﬁts πi = piqi−rqi.W ed e n o t eb yQ = Fz
+ =
{q} the space of all feasible capacity conﬁgurations, where q =( q1,...,qz)
is a vector of capacities, one for each ﬁrm, which might result from stage-
1 capacity decisions. Furthermore, let q−i ∈ Fz−1
+ denote the capacity
conﬁguration of i’s rivals, Q total capacity, A = {i | qi > 0} and n =# A
the set and number of active ﬁrms at q, respectively, and g any ﬁrm with
the largest capacity. At stage 2 every i ∈ A knows q.
We would like to compare the outcome of strategic market interac-
tion through prices or quantities with the long-run competitive equilibrium,
namely, the equilibrium of the industry when price-taking potential entrants
make simultaneous capacity and quantity decisions. Unfortunately, the com-
petitive equilibrium may not exist. (For nonexistence under U-shaped av-
erage cost, see Novshek, 1980, pp. 473-4, and Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green, 1995, pp. 337-8). In fact, total supply S(p) is indeﬁnitely large at
p>r , and zero at p<r . If at zero proﬁts the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between
entering or not, then S(r) ∈ F+:a tp = r the ﬁrms choose any feasible ca-
pacity and supply it entirely. Thus it can only be S(r)=D(r) if D(r) ∈ F+.3
In the text we conveniently overcome nonexistence by restricting ourselves
to demand curves such that a−r
b ∈ F+; thus the “competitive” price (p∗)
and output (Q∗) are, respectively, p∗ = r and Q∗ = D(r).F u r t h e r m o r e ,
with D(r) ∈ F+ equilibria of our capacity and market games are much eas-
ier to characterize. (Equilibrium characterization for the D(r) / ∈ F+ case is
carried out in Appendix B.)
We denote by Q
∗ = {q∗} and by Q
∗∗ = {q∗∗} the sets of all capacity
conﬁgurations with D(r) and D(r)+1active ﬁrms, respectively, each with
2Consider any convex combination of f and f +1 , with weights k and 1 − k: the cost
to producing this output is C(kf +( 1− k)(f +1 ) )=r(f +1 )=rf + r, higher than
kC(f)+( 1− k)C(f +1 )=krf +( 1− k)r(f +1 ) =rf + r − kr.
3Even so, some coordination is needed for the ﬁr m st oe x a c t l ys u p p l yD(r).
4unitary capacity.
Deﬁnition 1. Each q∗ is such that n∗ = Q
∗ = D(r),a n de a c hq∗∗ is
such that n∗∗ = Q
∗∗ = D(r)+1 .
Note that Q
∗ is the set of the least concentrated capacity conﬁgurations
consistent with the long-run competitive capacity. By assumption, there are
suﬃciently many potential entrants for q∗∗ to be feasible (z>n ∗∗).
Further notation is now introduced. At any q,l e tpw(q) and Qw(q) be,
respectively, the market-clearing price and total output with price-taking
ﬁrms: pw(q)=P(Q) and Qw(q)=Q if Q ≤ D(0),w h i l epw(q)=0and
Qw(q)=D(0) if Q ≥ D(0). Henceforth πw
i (q)=( pw(q) − r)qi denotes i’s
market-clearing proﬁta tq and πw
i (qi,q−i)=( pw(qi,q−i) − r)qi denotes i’s
market-clearing proﬁt as a function of qi, given q−i.I fqi were continuous,
then concavity of πw
i (qi,q−i) would follow straightforwardly from D00(p) ≤ 0;
in our context, ∂2πw
i (qi,q−i)/∂q2
i = −2b when qi +
P
j6=i qj <D (0).
3 The capacity and price game
3.1 The price subgame
We characterize the equilibrium of the price subgame at any q.L e tp−i be
the prices of i’s rivals and di(pi,p −i,q) the demand facing i at prices (pi,p −i).
The ﬁrms produce on demand, hence ﬁrm i’s output is qi(pi,p −i,q)=
min{di(pi,p −i,q),qi}. Under eﬃcient rationing, di(pi,p −i,q)=m a x {0,D(pi)− P
j6=i qj} when pi >p j for any j 6= i ∈ A. Let e qi = e q(
P






=0and let e Πi = P(e qi +
P
j6=i qj)e qi. Note
t h a t ,s ol o n ga se qi ≤ qi, e qi and e Πi are, respectively, ﬁrm i’s (short-run)
Cournot best response and revenue in the face of an output of
P
j6=i qj by
its rivals. With D00(p) ≤ 0, e q0(·) < 0 for
P
j6=i qj <D (0).W e a l s o l e t
e pi = e p(
P







=0 .N o t e
that e pi is ﬁrm i’s best price response to strategy proﬁle p−i so long as
e pi ≥ P(Q) and e pi ≥ pj for any j 6= i. It is 0 < e pi ≤ P(
P
j6=i qj);f u r -
thermore, maxi pi = e pg because e p0(·) < 0 for
P
j6=i qj <D (0). Clearly,
e pi = P(e qi +
P













5Let πi(q) and Πi(q) be, respectively, i’s expected proﬁt and revenue at an
equilibrium of the price subgame. The following result is easily established.
Lemma 1. For any i ∈ A, πi(q) ≥ πw
i (q).
Proof. The claim is obvious when pw(q)=0 .W i t h pw(q)=P(Q),
by charging pw(q) ﬁrm i guarantees itself full capacity utilization, hence a
proﬁto fπw
i (q), regardless of p−i.
We now see that, with Q 6= D(0), the market-clearing price obtains at
an equilibrium of the price subgame provided individual capacities are small
compared to industry capacity (for the symmetric case, see Vives, 1986).
Lemma 2. As m a l lqg/Q is necessary and suﬃcient for: (i) all prices
e q u a lt oz e r ot ob ea ne q u i l i b r i u mo ft h ep r i c es u b g a m ew h e nQ>D (0);
( i i )a l lp r i c e se q u a lt oP(Q) t ob et h ee q u i l i b r i u mo ft h ep r i c es u b g a m ew h e n
Q<D (0).
Proof. (i) All prices equal to zero is an equilibrium if and only if P
j6=g qj ≥ D(0) or, equivalently, qg/Q ≤ 1 − D(0)/Q:f o ra n yD(0) and
Q ≥ 2, this condition will hold if qg/Q is suﬃciently small.4
(ii) From concavity of pi(D(pi) −
P
j6=i qj),e a c hﬁrm charging P(Q) is











p=P(Q) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ A,
(3)
that is, if and only if qg ≤− P(Q)[D0(p)]p=P(Q). This can in turn be written
as
qg/Q ≤ ηp=P(Q),( 4 )
where ηp=P(Q) denotes absolute elasticity of D(p) at a price of P(Q).U n i q u e -
ness of equilibrium can be established similarly as in KS.
Note, incidentally, that, because of concavity of pi(D(pi)−
P
j6=i qj) and
since e p 0(·) < 0, ineq. (3) amounts to
e pg ≤ P(Q). (5)
4Remaining equilibria have suﬃciently many ﬁrms charging 0 so that
P
j6=i:pj=0 qj ≥
D(0) for any i : pi =0 .
6where e pg = e p(
P
j6=g qj). A pure-strategy equilibrium (p.s.e.) does not exist
when Q ≥ D(0) and
P
j6=g qj <D (0) or when Q<D (0) and e pg >P (Q).
Then a mixed-strategy equilibrium (m.s.e.) exists; in fact, as we now see, all
the suﬃcient conditions of Theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) for
equilibrium existence are satisﬁed. Let Πi(pi,p −i;q) denote ﬁrm i’s expected
revenue in terms of (pi,p −i),g i v e nq. First, for any i ∈ A, Πi(pi,p −i;q) is
bounded and continuous in pi,e x c e p ta t(pi,p −i) such that pi = pj for




j6=i:pj=pi qj + qi, where Πi(·)
is weakly lower semi-continuous (at any such (pi,p −i), a slight reduction in
pi r e s u l t si na nu p w a r dj u m pi nΠi(·)). Second,
P
i∈A Πi(·) is continuous,
hence upper semicontinuous, in (pi,p −i). As to the properties of m.s.e., since
KS it has been known that, under duopoly, expected equilibrium revenue
for the largest ﬁrm equals the revenue of the Stackelberg follower when
the rival supplies its entire capacity. While this property was subsequently
extended to symmetric oligopoly (Vives, 1986), the following lemma (based
on a claim by Boccard and Wauthy, 2000, subsequently further developed
by De Francesco, 2003) establishes its generality.
Lemma 3. At any q for which no p.s.e. exists, ﬁrm g’s expected
equilibrium revenue is Πg(q)=e Πg = e pge qg,w h e r ee qg < qg.
Proof. See De Francesco (2003).
Remark 1. Let πw
i (qi = e qi,q−i) ≡ πw




j6=i qj)−r)e qi.F i r mg’s expected proﬁta tam . s . e . ,πg(q)=e pge qg −
rqg, can then be written πg(q)=πw
g (e qg,q−g) − r(qg − e qg).
3.1.1 Solving the entire game
Looking for subgame perfect equilibria of the capacity and price game, we
begin ruling out any q/ ∈ Q
∗.
Lemma 4. Capacity conﬁgurations outside Q
∗ = {q∗} cannot occur at
an equilibrium of the capacity and price game.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Now we see that any capacity conﬁguration q∗ is part of an equilibrium,
with pricing on the equilibrium path depending on the size of D(r).
Proposition 1 At an equilibrium of the capacity and price game: (i) if
b ≤ r (that is, D(r) ≥ (a − r)/r), then the capacity conﬁguration is any q∗
and the ﬁrms charge the competitive price r on the equilibrium path; (ii) if
7b>r(that is, D(r) < (a − r)/r), then the capacity conﬁguration is any q∗
and the ﬁrms randomize over prices on the equilibrium path.
Proof. (i) Coherently with our notation, we let e p∗





i = e p(
P
j6=i q∗∗
j ). By substitution into eq. (2), e p∗
i =( r+b)/2, hence e p∗
i ≤ r
i fa n do n l yi fb ≤ r. This being so, a p.s.e. for the price subgame obtaines
at q∗ and πi(q∗)=0 .A n y i ∈ A∗ 5 has made a best capacity response to
q∗
−i, no matter whether e p∗
i T P(Q
∗ +1 ) .I fe p∗
i >P (Q
∗ +1 ) , then a m.s.e.
obtains when i deviates to qi ≥ 2, resulting in πi(qi,q∗
−i)=e p∗
i e q∗
i − rqi. This
is negative because e p∗
i ≤ r and 1 ≤ e q∗
i < 2 ≤ qi.I fe p∗
i ≤ P(Q
∗ +1 ) , then
deviating to qi =2leads to a p.s.e., hence to a loss. A fortiori losses would
result from deviating to any qi > 2 entailing a p.s.e.. If choosing qi > 2
leading to a m.s.e., then πi(qi,q∗
−i)=e p∗
i e q∗




i < qi. Finally, at q∗ any ﬁrm u/ ∈ A∗ has made a best response.
Suppose u deviate to qu =1 .T h e r e s u l t i n g c o n ﬁguration (qu =1 ,q∗
−u)
can be denoted by q∗∗:t h u sπu(qu =1 ,q∗
−u)=πi(q∗∗), πi(q∗∗) being the
equilibrium payoﬀ of any i ∈ A∗∗ at q∗∗.O b v i o u s l y πi(q∗∗) < 0 if a p.s.e.
obtains at q∗∗. If a m.s.e. obtains, then πi(q∗∗)=e p∗∗
i e q∗∗
i −r;t h i si sn e g a t i v e
because e p∗∗
i = r/2 and e q∗∗
i < 1. T h i n g sw o u l db ee v e nw o r s ef o ru if entering
with qu > 1.
(ii) A m.s.e. obtains at q∗, hence πi(q∗)=e p∗
i e q∗
i −r>0. Every i ∈ A∗ has
replied optimally because deviating to qi > 1 raises cost without aﬀecting
subgame equilibrium (hence expected revenue). Any u/ ∈ A∗ has also made
a best response: if deviating to qu =1 , πu(qu,q∗
−u)=πi(q∗∗) < 0 at the
m.s.e. of the resulting subgame.
The symmetric m.s.e. obtaining at q∗ when b>rcan be computed
along standard lines (see Vives, 1999, pp. 130-1). There is an atomless
equilibrium distribution, φ(p), over a compact support S =[ p∗,p∗]; since
expected revenue is e Π∗
i = e p∗
i e q∗
i , we have p∗ = e p∗
i and p∗ = e Π∗










To summarize: at any solution of the game, total capacity equals the
long-run competitive output D(r),e a c ha c t i v eﬁrm has the minimum feasible
size, and the competitive price emerges on the equilibrium path so long as
D(r) ≥ (a−r)/r,o re l s et h eﬁrms randomize over prices. Note, incidentally,
that what really matters is the size of D(r) relative to the ﬁrm minimum
eﬃcient size (α), which we normalized to 1.
5Consistent with our terminology, A
∗ = {i | q
∗
i =1 }.
84 The capacity and quantity game
We now determine Cournot equilibrium with entry. Cournot competitors are
simultaneous quantity setters that take the price equal to the demand price
of the total output brought to the market. In a long-run setting, Cournot
competitors are simultaneous capacity setters. Under KS’s assumption of
perfect capacity divisibility, capacity is obviously set equal to the planned
output. However, with indivisibility, equilibrium output might be less than
capacity.
We keep the two-stage setup: potential entrants choose capacity and
active ﬁrms subsequently choose output. A static setup - where the ﬁrms
choose simultaneously a capacity and quantity pair - is perhaps more akin
to the normal way of portraying long-run Cournot competition. Yet, the
two-stage setup is not fundamentally misleading: as will be shown in Ap-
pendix C, any (subgame-perfect) equilibrium outcome of the two-stage game
constitutes an equilibrium of the static capacity and quantity game.
As can easily be checked, when the equilibrium of the quantity subgame
at q involves an internal maximum for each of the n active ﬁrms, then the
equilibrium is symmetric, with qi = a
b(n+1) and Πi = a2
b(n+1)2. Taking stock
of this, we now look for equilibria of the capacity and quantity game. We
preliminarily dispose of any q such that qg > 1.
Lemma 5. No q where qg > 1 can occur at an equilibrium of the capacity
and quantity game.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We can now provide a full characterization of equilibria for the capacity
and quantity game.
Proposition 2 At an equilibrium of the capacity and quantity game: (i) if
b ≤ r, then the capacity conﬁguration is any q∗ and the ﬁrms produce their
capacity on the equilibrium path, resulting in the competitive price r; (ii.a)
if b>r> a2b
(a+2b−r)2, then the capacity conﬁguration is any q∗ and the ﬁrms
produce below capacity on the equilibrium path; (ii.b) if b> a2b
(a+2b−r)2 ≥ r,
then the capacity conﬁguration is any q§ such that n§ = Q




br <n §+1, and the ﬁrms produce below capacity on the equilibrium path.
Proof. (i) Since b ≤ r, ∂[qiP(qi +
P
j6=i q∗
j)]/∂qi ≥ 0 at qi =1:at q∗,
the ﬁrms produce their capacity at the equilibrium of the quantity subgame.
Any i ∈ A∗ has made a best capacity response. To this eﬀect, note that
9e q∗
i = b+r
2b , where e q∗
i is i’s unconstrained (short-run) best quantity response
to an output of
P
j6=i q∗
j.L e tk ∈ F+ : k − 1 < e q∗
i ≤ k. As one can check,
if i deviates to qi = k, then, at the subgame equilibrium, qi = e q∗
i and
qj = q∗
j =1for any j 6= i ∈ A∗;t h u sQ>D (r) and p = P(Q) <r .With
k ≥ 3, deviating to any qi ∈ {2,...,k− 1} results in qi = qi and qj = q∗
j =1
for any j 6= i ∈ A∗: again Q>D (r). A loss would also be faced by any
u/ ∈ A∗ if entering. Deviating to qu =1results in a conﬁguration q∗∗.I f
b ≤ r/2, then a boundary solution obtains for the quantity subgame, so that
Q = Q
∗ +1>D (r). As for a deviation to qu > 1 one can adapt a previous
argument to see that Q>D (r).I fr/2 <b≤ r, an internal solution obtains






As to conﬁgurations outside Q
∗, in view of Lemma 5 we just need to
focus on any conﬁguration q : n = Q 6= D(r).A n y q : n = Q<D (r)
is immediately dismissed since any inactive ﬁrm would proﬁt from entering
with qu =1 .6 As to any q : n = Q = D(r)+l (with l ≥ 1), note that an
internal solution obtains for the quantity subgame if b(1+l) >r .(The case
of a boundary solution is trivial.) Equilibrium revenue is then a2
b(n+1)2 =
a2b
[a+b(1+l)−r]2 <b≤ r:a n ya c t i v eﬁrm makes losses.
(ii.a) With b>r ,an internal solution for the quantity subgame obtains
at q∗ and πi(q∗) > 0. A best response has been made at stage 1 by any
i ∈ A∗: deviating to qi > 1 would raise cost without aﬀecting subgame
equilibrium. As to any u/ ∈ A∗, entering would aﬀord revenue Πi(q∗∗)=
a2b/(a +2 b − r)2 <r , no matter qu. Other conﬁgurations where active
ﬁrms have one unit of capacity are easily dismissed: we have just seen that
πi(q∗∗) < 0; then, a fortiori πi(q) < 0 for any q : n = Q>D (r)+1 .
(ii.b) Note that n§ is the largest integer solution of a2
b(n+1)2 ≥ r. Thus, for
any u/ ∈ A§, s t a y i n go u ti st h eb e s tr e s p o n s ea tq§. Any i ∈ A§ has also made
a best response because a capacity increase would just raise costs. Other qs
where active ﬁrms have one unit of capacity are easily dismissed.
By comparing Propositions 1 and 2 we can see that the outcomes of
Cournot and price competition do coincide so long as D(r) is suﬃciently
large, the competitive price then emerging in either setting: on the equi-
librium path, there will be D(r) active ﬁrms, each producing its unitary
capacity. With D(r) not that large, the two settings yield quite diﬀerent
outcomes. On the equilibrium path of the capacity and price game there are
6With Q = Q
∗
− 1, entry would result in zero proﬁts. Any such q is disposed of if, at
zero proﬁt, entering is strictly preferred to not entering.
10still D(r) active ﬁrms, each with unitary capacity, which are now playing
a m.s.e. of the price subgame. Under Cournot competition, active ﬁrms
are producing below their unitary capacity on the equilibrium path; much
interestingly, there may be much more than D(r) active ﬁrms (as illustrated
by the last example below), hence the level of total capacity may exceed
competitive capacity.
Examples. 1. a =1 5 ,b=1 , and r =2 . At an equilibrium of either
game, n = Q = D(r)=1 3 , and the competitive price r obtains.
2. a =1 0 .5,b=3 , and r =1 .5. At an equilibrium of either game,
n = Q = D(r)=3 , but stage-2 equilibrium variables diﬀer. In the price sub-
game, Πi = e Π∗




p(1.5−p) over S =[ 1 .6875,2.25];
in the quantity subgame, qi = .875, p =2 .625, and Πi =2 .296875.
3. a =1 7 ,b=2 , and r =1 . In the capacity and price game, n = Q =
D(r)=8 , Πi = e Π∗




p(1−p) over S =[ 1 .125,1.5].
Capacity is much larger at a Cournot equilibrium: n = Q = n§ =1 1 ,
qi =1 7 /24,p=1 7 /12, and Πi = 289/288. ¦
5 The role of capacity indivisibility
With nonconvexities in long-run costs, “excess capacity” - namely, active
ﬁrms producing less than the average cost minimizing output - is a common
feature of models of imperfect competition with entry (for this result in the
Cournot setting, see Novshek, 1980). On the other hand, the possibility of
Cournot and Bertrand-Edgeworth competition exactly yielding the compet-
itive result constitutes one distinctive feature of our model. It can easily be
understood that this result relies upon the discontinuities in the cost func-
tion. Suppose, as before, a unique technology to be available, but now let
capacity be a continuous choice variable: then, long-run cost is c(qi)=rqi
for any qi ∈ R+.C o n s i d e ra n yq such that Q = D(r) and p = P(Q)=r at
an equilibrium of both the price and quantity subgame. Clearly, any active
ﬁrm has not made a best capacity response: by reducing capacity the new
(short-run) market-clearing price would be raised above r, thus allowing for
positive proﬁts at the price or quantity subgame. In contrast, there is no
such opportunity in our model because, at the candidate equilibrium,7 the
ﬁrms are endowed with the minimum capacity that is technically feasible.
7See Lemmas 4 and 5.
11Although our model has been developed assuming availability of a single
technology, one might allow for a plurality of technologies and still end up
with the long-run competitive outcome at an equilibrium of either game. To
see this in the easiest way, let another technology, β, be also available, be-
sides α. Similar to α, if choosing β the capacity choice set will be C(β) = βF+
and average cost will be constant at r0 under full capacity utilization. We
take β to be a “less mechanized” technology, allowing for a lower minimum
capacity (β < α =1 ). Furthermore, we let r0β <r<r 0: the average-cost
minimizing technology is α, although β is cheaper at a suﬃciently low out-
put. It might easily be veriﬁed that at the long-run competitive equilibrium
technology α will be adopted and that p∗ = r and Q
∗ = D(r).N o w , s o
long as b ≤ r, this same outcome may still arise at an equilibrium of either
game, with each active ﬁrm endowed with one unit of capacity. On reﬂec-
tion, this is actually the case when, at q∗,8 it does not pay any i ∈ A∗ to
deviate to technology β and install any capacity qi ∈ β[1,...,k] < 1,w h e r e
k<1/β <k+1 .9 Note that, with price competition as well as Cournot
competition, at the resulting subgame the deviant will sell qi at the new
market-clearing price, r + b(1 − qi). Then such a move will lead to losses
if r + b(1 − qi) <r 0. It follows that deviating to any feasible qi < 1 is
unproﬁt a b l es ol o n ga sβ > [b − (r0 − r)]/b.
Finally, it must be emphasized that capacity indivisibility is crucial for
the possibility of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition not yielding the Cournot
outcome, in contrast to KS. This can be seen by showing that, with (weak)
convexity in costs, the result established by KS for a duopoly will always
hold. Let D00(p) ≤ 0, c00(qi) ≥ 0, and - as before - variable cost be zero for
qi ≤ qi. What matters most, no q involving a m.s.e. of the price subgame
can arise at an equilibrium of the capacity and price game. Indeed, in view
of Lemma 3, at any such q it is πg(q)=πw
g (e qg,q−g) − [c(qg) − c(e qg)],w h e r e
e qg < qg. Then g has not made a best capacity response: by Lemma 1,
with capacity e qg i tw o u l de a r na tl e a s tπw
g (e qg,q−g). Furthermore, unlike
under capacity indivisibility, proﬁts are positive at an equilibrium of the
entire game, no matter the number of ﬁrms: if not, any active ﬁrm would
proﬁt from deviating to a lower capacity and then charging the new market-
clearing price. Thus the equilibrium price is higher than unit cost. It follows
that all ﬁrms are active at an equilibrium of the entire game: if not, any
inactive ﬁrm would proﬁt from entering with a suﬃciently small capacity
and then charging the market-clearing price.
8As before, q
∗ is such that q
∗
i = α =1for each i ∈ A
∗ and n
∗ = D(r).
9Installing any qi ≥ 1 while deviating to β is immediately discarded.
12The equilibrium of the (Cournot) capacity and quantity game is a proﬁle









 = c0(qi) for all i ∈ Z. (6)
Any Cournot equilibrium is symmetric; furthermore, provided P(0) >c 0(0),
equilibrium existence is guaranteed by (weak) concavity of demand and
(weak) cost convexity. Of course, the left-hand side of (6) is positive at
the Cournot equilibrium, hence e qc
i > qc
i,w h e r ee qc
i is ﬁrm i’s (short-run) un-
constrained best response in the face of a total output of
P
j6=i qj =( z−1)qc
i:
on the equilibrium path, qc
i = qi
c for any i ∈ Z and p = P(Q
c).
We can now establish the Cournot outcome of the capacity and price
game (see also Boccard and Wauthy, 2000 and 2004).
Proposition 3 At an equilibrium of the capacity and price game, the ca-
pacity conﬁguration is qc and all ﬁrms charge P(Q
c) on the equilibrium path.
Proof. Among conﬁgurations involving a p.s.e. for the price subgame,
consider any q such that d[P(qi +
P
j6=i qj)qi]/dqi >c 0(qi) for some ﬁrm
i.A n y s u c h i has not made a best capacity response: by marginally
increasing qi and then charging the market-clearing price, it would raise
revenues more than cost. We can likewise dispose of any q such that
d[P(qi +
P
j6=i qj)qi]/dqi <c 0(qi) for some i.T o c h e c k t h a t qc is instead
an equilibrium, let i deviate to qi > qc
i.I f qi ≤ e qc
i, then, by concav-
ity of P(qi +
P
j6=i qj)qi − c(qi),i ’s proﬁt would be less than at qc at the
p.s.e. of the price subgame. Prospects are even worse if qi > e qc
i : a m.s.e.






i, no matter qi. Next consider a deviation to qi < qc
i. As qi
decreases, e pj increases at rate −1/[2D0(·)+P(·)D00(·)] for any j 6= i, whereas
the market-clearing price P(qi+
P
j6=i qc
j) increases at the faster rate −P0(·).
Therefore, e pj <P(qi +
P
j6=i qc
j) for any j 6= i: the price subgame has still
a p.s.e. and we can use the previous argument to conclude that i’s proﬁts
decrease.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The paper has analyzed entry and strategic market interaction through
prices or quantities as a two-stage game where many potential entrants are
13facing a discrete capacity choice set. Whether the ﬁrms are price setters or
Cournot quantity setters, the equilibrium outcome has been seen to depend
on how large is total demand at a price equal to the minimum average cost:
with total demand large enough compared to the ﬁrm minimum eﬃcient
size, the competitive price emerges in either game; with total demand not
that large, the competitive outcome does not arise and equilibrium outcomes
are quite diﬀerent in the two strategic settings.
Our two main results - the possibility of either game yielding exactly
the competitive outcome and the possibility of the capacity and price game
not yielding the Cournot outcome - rely upon the discontinuities in the cost
function, which have in turn been derived from capital indivisibility under
the simplifying assumption of availability of a single technology. Checking
how these results should be qualiﬁed when assuming a plurality of available
technologies - which would mitigate to some extent the degree of capacity
indivisibility - is a task that we leave to future research.
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APPENDIX
A. Remaining proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . Let q
†
i = argmaxqiπw
i (qi,q−i) when qi is viewed
as a continuous variable: q
†




j6=i qj ≤ D(r).













∗ denote the complementary set of Q
∗ in the space Q of
capacity conﬁgurations. It is usefully partitioned into ﬁve subsets.
(a) {q | Q<Q
∗}.A ta n ys u c hq,a n yu/ ∈ A has not replied optimally, for
it would proﬁt from deviating to qu =1a n dt h e nc h a r g i n gpu = P(Q+1).10
(b) {q | Q = Q
∗;qg > 1}. No matter whether the price subgame has a
p.s.e. or a m.s.e. at q , ﬁrm g would beneﬁt from deviating to qg − 1.I n
the former case this is immediate: πi(q)=0for any i ∈ A,w h e r e a sg would
proﬁt from deviating to qg−1 a n dt h e nc h a r g i n gP(Q
∗−1) >r . In the latter
case, e pg >rand πg(q)=e Πg − rqg. Then there are two possibilities: either
e pg ≥ P(Q
∗−1) or e pg <P(Q
∗−1). If e pg ≥ P(Q
∗−1), then deviating to qg−1
10With Q = Q
∗
−1, this would result in zero proﬁts if the resulting subgame has a p.s.e..
Any such q is disposed of if, at zero proﬁt, entering is strictly preferred to not entering.
15would raise g’s expected proﬁta tl e a s tt oe Πg − r(qg − 1): since rivals can
produce
P
j6=g qj at most, ﬁrm g will sell at least e qg = D(e pg) −
P
j6=g qj ≤
qg − 1 when charging e pg.I fe pg <P (Q
∗ − 1),t h e nqg − 1 < e qg < qg.T h e
capacity reduction is then conveniently decomposed into two virtual steps:
a reduction from qg to e qg and then from e qg to qg − 1.B y L e m m a 1 , i t
suﬃces to prove that g’s proﬁt would rise if, at each step, g were to charge
the (short-run) market-clearing price. Assuming so, then g’s proﬁtw o u l d
rise to πw
g (e qg,q−g) at the ﬁrst step. At the second step, g’s proﬁtw o u l d
become πw
g (qg − 1,q−g): by eq. (7), this is larger than πw
g (e qg,q−g) because
q
†
g ≤ qg − 1 < qg at any q : n<Q = Q
∗.
(c) {q | Q ≥ Q
∗+1;e pg ≤ P(Q)}.A n ys u c hq has a p.s.e., hence πi(q) < 0
for any i ∈ A given that P(Q) <r .
(d) {q | Q = Q
∗ +1 ;e pg >P (Q)}. Any such q involves a m.s.e.. Any
q : qg > 1 is dismissed as in part (b) above. As to the remaining subset
{q∗∗}, note that e p∗∗
i = r/2, hence πi(q∗∗)=e p∗∗
i e q∗∗
i − r<e p∗∗
i − r<0.
(e) {q | Q>Q
∗+1;e pg >P(Q)}. Any such q has a m.s.e.. In this region,
at any q : n = Q, it is πi(q)=e pie qi − r<0:i n f a c t ,e qi < qi =1and




j6=i qj ≥ Q
∗+1. Turn now to any
q : qg > 1.I fe pg >P(Q−1), then we can argue as in (b). If e pg ≤ P(Q−1),
then e pg <rgiven that P(Q − 1) <r :a l o n gw i t he qg < qg, this reveals that
πg(q)=e pge qg − rqg < 0.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 . At conﬁgurations such that Q<D (r) it would
pay any inactive ﬁrm to deviate to qu =1 . Remaining conﬁgurations are
partitioned according to whether Q = D(r) or Q>D (r).
(a) Conﬁgurations such that Q = D(r).
Let G =# {i : qi = qg}.C o n ﬁgurations such that Q = D(r) at the
equilibrium of the quantity subgame are immediately disposed of: any ﬁrm
g would proﬁtf r o md e v i a t i n gt oqg −1, which would raise the market price
above r. So we turn to qs such that qg < qg.11 Denote by l any of the next to
the largest ﬁrm(s). One possibility is that, at the equilibrium of the quantity
subgame, ﬁrms l too reach a capacity-unconstrained maximum in revenues:
then ql = qg ≤ ql ≤ qg−1.I ns u c ha ne v e n t ,ﬁrm g would clearly proﬁtf r o m
deviating to ql, which would just reduce its cost. Alternatively, it may be
that qj = qj for any j : qj < qg : then, as one can check, qg =
r+bGqg
b(1+G).O n e
possible reason why such q cannot occur at an equilibrium of the entire game
is that it might pay any u to deviate to qu =1 .I fu so deviates, then qg < qg
11As can easily be checked, qg < qg when Q<Q at an equilibrium of the quantity
subgame.
16at the equilibrium of the new quantity subgame. Note, also, that n<n ∗,
where n is the number of ﬁrms at q, with n = n∗ − 1 i fa n do n l yi fqg =2
and G =1 . Therefore, at the new quantity subgame - where there are n+1
ﬁrms - an internal symmetric equilibrium obtains if and only if b>rand
n = n∗ −1. This being the case, u’s proﬁtw i l lb e a2
b(n∗+1)2 −r>0.I ne v e r y
other circumstance, it will instead be qu =1 . Now, if at least ﬁrms l -a l o n g
with ﬁrms g - reach a capacity-unconstrained maximum in revenues at the
new subgame equilibrium, then, at this equilibrium, Q<D (r) given that
Q = D(r) and ql = qg ≤ qg−1:ﬁrm u will earn the positive proﬁt P(Q)−r.
The remaining case is when, after u’s deviation, qj = qj for any j : qj < qg.




1+G , and πu =
r+bGqg−b
1+G −r:h e n c e
πu ≥ 0 so long as qg ≥ r
b + 1
G. If instead qg < r
b + 1
G, then it can be seen that
it pays any g to deviate to qg − 1.D e n o t eb yq0 the capacity conﬁguration
after g’s deviation to qg − 1 and by Q0,P (Q0), and πg(q0), respectively, the
total quantity, market price, and g’s proﬁt at the resulting equilibrium of
the quantity subgame. It must preliminarily be seen that all ﬁrms are now
producing their capacity given that qg < r
b + 1
G.T h i si so b v i o u sa sf o ra n yj :
qj < qg, so we must prove that qr = qr for any r 6= g : qr = qg. Consistently
with our notation, let e qr denote ﬁrm r’s (capacity unconstrained) short-run
best quantity response when all the other ﬁrms are believed to produce their
capacity: e qr =
r+bqg+b
2b ≥ qg if and only if qg ≤ (r/b)+1 , w h i c hi ni t st u r n
holds true given that qg < r
b + 1
G.A sQ0 = D(r)−1,i tw i l lb eP(Q0)=b+r.
Thus πg(q0)=bqg − b, which is higher than g’s initial proﬁt
(r+bGqg)2
b(1+G)2 − rqg
i fa n do n l yi f
b(1 + G)2qg(b + r) − b2(1 + G)2 − (r + bGqg)2 > 0. (8)
With qg =2and G ∈ {1,2}, validity of (8) is established by substitution
and taking account of qg >r / band qg <r / b+1 /G.12 For all remaining
cases, recall that b(1+G)qg >r+bGqg, as qg < qg. Therefore, we would be
done by establishing the following, more restrictive inequality:
(r + bGqg)(1 + G)(b + r) − b2(1 + G)2 − (r + bGqg)2 > 0. (9)
Letting h = r
b + 1
G −qg and recalling that qg =
r+bGqg





12Inequality qg >r / bfollows from the fact that, at the equilibrium of the quantity
subgame at q, qg < qg and qj = qj for any j : qj < qg.
17Given that the right-hand side is less than 2 and qg > qg − 1, ineq. (10)
is certainly met if qg > 2.A st ot h er e m a i n i n gc a s eo fqg =2and G>2,
qg = r+2bG
b(1+G) > 1+G
G , given that qg =2< r
b + 1
G.
(b) Conﬁgurations such that Q>D (r).
We can restrict ourselves to qs such that, at the equilibrium of the quan-
tity subgame, Q<D (r), qg − 1 <q g < qg and qj = qj for any j : qj < qg
(other conﬁgurations are dismissed by drawing on arguments made in part
(a)). It must preliminarily be seen that it is necessarily G>∆, where
∆ = Q − D(r). In fact, at the qs under concern, Q =
P
j:qj<qg qj +
Gqg=D(r)+∆ − Gqg + Gqg>D(r)+∆ − Gqg + G(qg − 1)=D(r)+∆ − G,
hence it has to be G>∆ in order for Q<D (r).
O n ep o s s i b l er e a s o nw h ya n ys u c hq is ruled out as an equilibrium is that
any inactive ﬁrm might proﬁt from entering with qu =1 .L e t n = J + G
denote the number of ﬁrms at q, where J =# {j : qj < qg}. It should
be understood that, at the conﬁgurations under concern, n ≤ n∗ − 1,w i t h
n = n∗ − 1 when ∆ = G − 1 and qg =2 .13 Thus the subgame originating
from u’s deviation has an internal equilibrium if and only if b>rand
n = n∗ − 1,i nw h i c hc a s eu’s proﬁtw i l lb e a2
b(n∗+1)2 − r>0, just as when
Q = D(r). I fn o t ,i tw i l lb equ =1 . Then there are two possibilities,
similarly to when Q = D(r). It may be that, besides ﬁrms g, ﬁrms l also
reach a capacity-unconstrained maximum in revenues at the new subgame
equilibrium. Then total output will be not higher than D(r) and ﬁrm u will
thus earn nonnegative proﬁts.14 Or it may be that, at the new subgame
equilibrium, qj = qj for any j : qj < qg.T h e nqg =
r−b∆+bGqg−b
b(1+G) , the price
is
r−b∆+bGqg−b
1+G and ﬁrm u earns
r−b∆+bGqg−b
1+G −r.T h u si tp a y su to enter so




If instead qg < r
b + 1
G + ∆
G, how can q b ed i s m i s s e da sa ne q u i l i b r i u m ?
By showing that, in such a case, any g makes a loss at q:
πg(q)=
(r − b∆ + bGqg)2
b(1 + G)2 − rqg < 0. (11)
13For any given G, one requisite for maximal J is that qj =1for any j : qj < qg,i n
which case J = D(r)+∆−Gqg = n
∗ +∆−Gqg. This in its turn is maximal when qg =2
and ∆ = G−1 (given the constraint that G>∆), resulting in J = n
∗ −1−G. Therefore,
maximal n equals n
∗ − 1.
14Note that, at q, total equilibrium output is
P
j:qj<ql qj + Lql + Gqg <D (r), where
L =# {i : qi = ql}. Therefore,
P
j:qj<ql qj +( L + G)ql ≤ D(r) − 1 given that ql <q g
and capacities are integers. Consequently, total output at the new subgame equilibrium
is
P
j:qj<ql qj +1+( L + G)ql ≤ D(r) since ql ≤ ql.











that is, when u makes zero proﬁts if deviating to qu =1 .M a k i n g u s e o f
(12), our desired inequality (11) turns out to amount to r(1+G)[G(1−∆)−
∆−1]+bG < 0, hence to (bqg− b∆
G − b
G)(1+G)[G(1−∆)−∆−1]+bG < 0.
Since the left-hand side is decreasing in qg,i ts u ﬃces to prove this inequality
for qg =2 , when it becomes
G2 < (2G − ∆ − 1)(1 + G)[∆ +1+G(∆ − 1)]. (13)
Validity of (13) is immediate once it is recalled that 1 ≤ ∆ <G : then, on
the right-hand side, (2G−∆−1)(1+G) >G 2 and ∆+1+G(∆−1) > 1.
B. Allowing for noninteger D(r)
B.1. An alternative “competitive” benchmark
As already seen, a long-run competitive equilibrium - based on the
assumption of price-taking entrants - does not exist when D(r) / ∈ F+.
I na n ys u c hc a s e ,l e tu sr e d e ﬁne the “competitive” capacity Q
∗ as the
largest capacity consistent with nonnegative proﬁts under market-clearing
and the “competitive” price p∗ as the corresponding market-clearing price:
Q
∗ =( D(r) − 1,D(r)] ∩ F+ and p∗ = P(Q
∗).Aj u s t i ﬁcation for this termi-
nology can be provided in terms of a two-stage capacity and quantity game
with a competitive output market. In such a game, potential entrants choose
capacities at stage 1; at stage 2, active ﬁrms choose quantities while taking
the market price as given, its being set by an auctioneer equating demand
and total supply. In this setting, potential entrants do recognize how their
capacity decisions are going to aﬀect stage-2 market-clearing price. (See
Dixon, 1985, where investment decisions by entrants are studied in a similar
setting.) We refer to any subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of such a
game as a “long-run equilibrium with competitive pricing” (LRECP).
Let δ = D(r) − Q
∗ < 1.N o t et h a tQ
∗ ∈ (a−r−b
b , a−r
b ] and p∗ = r + bδ.
Now we are able to characterize any LRECP.
Proposition 4 At an LRECP, the industry conﬁguration is any q∗, result-
ing in price p∗.
19Proof. At q∗ the market-clearing price is p∗. Any potential entrant has
made a best response: a deviation to qi > 1 by any i ∈ A∗ or to qu > 0 by
any u/ ∈ A∗ would yield losses at the new market-clearing price. In contrast,
no q/ ∈ {q∗} can occur at an LRECP. At q : Q ≤ Q
∗ − 1,i tp a y sa n yu/ ∈ A
to deviate to qu =1 .15 At q : Q>Q
∗, πw
i (q) < 0 for any i ∈ A.T h u sw ea r e
left with q : n<Q = Q
∗. Then it always pays g to deviate to qg − 1. This
is immediate when D(r) ∈ F+, since then πw
g (q)=0 .W i t hD(r) / ∈ F+, it
is still πw
g (qg − 1,q−g) > πw
g (q). This can be seen using eq. (7) and the fact




2 than qg is: if qg > 2,t h e nq
†
g < qg −1 < qg;
if qg =2 ,t h e nq
†
g − (qg − 1) = 0.5δ < qg − q
†
g =1− 0.5δ.
To sum up, at each LRECP active ﬁrms have the minimum eﬃcient size
and total output is the largest one yielding nonnegative proﬁts under market
clearing.16
B.2. The capacity and price game








2 ).I nw h a t
follows, we will conﬁne ourselves to capacity conﬁgurations inside Q
∗ ∪Q
∗∗:
in fact, conﬁgurations outside this set cannot occur at an equilibrium of the
capacity and price game.17
Similarly to when D(r) ∈ F+, inequality b ≤ r guarantees the emergence
of p∗ at an equilibrium of the capacity and price game.
Lemma 6. If b ≤ r, then at an equilibrium of the capacity and price
game the capacity conﬁguration is any q∗ and prices are set at p∗ on the
equilibrium path.
Proof. A p.s.e. for the price subgame arises at q∗ i fa n do n l yi fδ ≥ b−r
b ,
which certainly holds true when b ≤ r.A t q∗ any ﬁrm has made a best
capacity response. As to any i ∈ A∗,i fe p∗
i ≤ P(Q
∗+1)the argument runs as
with D(r) ∈ F+.I fe p∗
i >P(Q
∗+1), then a m.s.e. for the price subgame will













i.A st oa n yu/ ∈ A∗, entering would lead to losses. Suppose
15If D(r) ∈ F+,t h e na n yq : Q = Q
∗
−1 is disposed of by our assumption that entry is
strictly preferred to not entering.
16Noteworthy, this is how the long-run competitive equilibrium is actually deﬁned in
microeconomic textbooks such as Varian (1984, pp. 85-90).
17The proof of this claim is omitted, for brevity.
20u deviates to qu =1and a m.s.e. obtains for the price subgame (otherwise
our case is trivial), which is so if and only if δ < 2b−r
b .T h e nu’s proﬁtr e a d s
πi(q∗∗)=e p∗∗
i e q∗∗
i − r, where e q∗∗
i < 1 and e p∗∗
i = r+bδ
2 <rsince b ≤ r.
On the other hand, unlike with D(r) ∈ F+,i n e q u a l i t yb ≤ r may not be
necessary for the emergence of p∗ at an equilibrium of the capacity and price
game. To see why, note that, as δ → 1, e p∗
i → r+2b
2 while p∗ → r + b>r+2b
2 .
Thus, e p∗
i ≤ p∗ for δ suﬃciently close to 1: at q∗ t h ep r i c es u b g a m em a y
have a p.s.e., even when b>r .With this insight, we can now address full
equilibrium characterization.
Proposition 5 At an equilibrium of the capacity and price game: (i) If
b ≤ r or b>rand b−r
b ≤ δ < 2
√
br−r
b , then the capacity conﬁguration
is any q∗ and prices are set at p∗ on the equilibrium path; (ii) if b>r




b }, then the capacity conﬁguration is any q∗ and a
m.s.e. for the price subgame obtains on the equilibrium path; (iii) if b>r
and δ ≥ 2
√
br−r
b , then the capacity conﬁguration is any q∗∗ and a m.s.e.
obtains for the price subgame on the equilibrium path.
Proof. (i) A p.s.e. obtains at q∗ given that b−r
b ≤ δ. At q∗ any ﬁrm
has made a best capacity response: in particular, if any u/ ∈ A∗ deviates to









(ii) A m.s.e. obtains at q∗. I tm i g h te a s i l yb es e e nt h a tb e s tc a p a c i t y
responses have been made at stage 1.
(iii) Inequality b>rguarantees that a m.s.e. obtains at q∗∗; further-
more, πi(q∗∗) ≥ 0 since δ ≥ 2
√
br−r
b .E a c h ﬁrm has made a best capacity
response. In particular, should any u/ ∈ A∗∗ deviate to qu =1 , then the
industry conﬁguration would become q∗∗∗ : n∗∗∗ = Q
∗∗∗ ≡ Q
∗ +2 . Firm u’s
expected proﬁtw o u l db eπi(q∗∗∗)=e p∗∗∗
i e q∗∗∗
i − r<0 because e q∗∗∗
i < 1 and
e p∗∗∗
i = r+bδ−b
2 <r . On the other hand, conﬁgurations q∗ cannot arise at an
equilibrium: any u/ ∈ A∗ would earn πi(q∗∗) ≥ 0 by deviating to qu =1 .
B.3. The capacity and quantity game
Equilibria of the capacity and quantity game will be searched in the
region {q | n = Q} of the space of capacity conﬁgurations. By so doing we
will actually discover any equilibrium so long as Lemma 5 extends to the
case of D(r) / ∈ F+ (something we do not attempt to prove).
As in the capacity and price game, inequality b ≤ r guarantees the
emergence of p∗ at an equilibrium of the capacity and quantity game.
21Lemma 7. If b ≤ r, then at an equilibrium of the capacity and quantity
game the capacity conﬁguration is any q∗ and the ﬁrms produce their capacity
on the equilibrium path, which results in market price p∗.
Proof. Inequality b ≤ r is suﬃcient for a boundary solution to obtain
for the quantity subgame at q∗. Any ﬁrm has made a best capacity response.
As to any i ∈ A∗, let k be the integer such that k −1 < e q∗
i ≤ k. If deviating
to qi = k, then, at the equilibrium of the new quantity subgame, qi = e q∗
i
and qj = q∗
j =1for any j 6= i ∈ A∗. Suppose ﬁrst k ≥ 3 so that e q∗
i > 2.
Then losses are made because Q =
P
j6=i q∗
j + e q∗
i = a−r
b − δ − 1+e q∗
i >D (r)
and hence P(Q) <r .Losses are also made if deviating to qi ∈ {2,...,k−1},
in which case qi = qi and qj =1for any j 6= i ∈ A∗, again resulting in
Q>D (r). With k =2 , deviating to qi =2leads to qi = e q∗
i and qj =1for
any j 6= i ∈ A∗.T h i sa ﬀords the deviant a proﬁto fπw
i (e q∗
i ,q∗
−i)−r(qi − e q∗
i ):
and, since e q∗






i (q∗).T u r nn o wt oa n yu/ ∈ A∗
and suppose it deviates to qu =1 . The quantity subgame has an internal
equilibrium if δ < (2b−r)/b (the case of a boundary equilibrium is trivial):
but then, as one can easily check, Q = an∗∗
b(n∗∗+1) > a−r
b , hence P(Q) <r .
Again similarly to the capacity and price game, inequality b ≤ r may
not be needed for the emergence of p∗ at an equilibrium of the capacity and
quantity game.
Proposition 6 At an equilibrium of the capacity and quantity game: (i) If
b ≤ r or b>rand b−r




b , then the capacity conﬁguration
is any q∗ and the ﬁrms produce their capacity on the equilibrium path, result-




b , then the capacity
conﬁguration is any q§ such that n§ = Q
§ and n§ ≤− 1+a
√
br
br <n §+1, and
the ﬁrms produce below capacity on the equilibrium path.
Proof. (i) In view of Lemma 7, we only need to deal with the case
b>r .A sb−r
b ≤ δ, a boundary solution obtains at q∗.A n yﬁrm has made
a best capacity response. In particular, any u/ ∈ A∗ would get Πi(q∗∗)=
a2
b(n∗∗+1)2 = a2b





b . This also allows us to dispose of any q : n = Q>Q
∗.
(ii) At q§, Πi = a2
b(n§+1)2 ≥ r for each i ∈ A§.A n yﬁrm has made a best
capacity response. As to any i ∈ A§, raising capacity would just raise costs;
as to any u/ ∈ A§, entering would lead to losses. Conﬁgurations q such that
n = Q>Q
§ are immediately disposed of, since πi(q) < 0.
22B.4. Examples and discussion
Examples.1 .W eb e g i ni l l u s t r a t i n gt h ec a s ew h e r et h e“ c o m p e t i t i v e ”
outcome obtains in either game. Let a =1 2 , r =1 .2, and b =1 .25, so
that D(r)=8 .64, Q
∗ =8 , and p∗ =2 . Note that b−r







b }. Then, in either game, the equilibrium capacity conﬁguration
is any q∗ and, on the equilibrium path: prices are set at p∗ at the equilibrium
of the price subgame; the ﬁrms produce their capacity at the equilibrium of
the quantity subgame, which results in market price p∗.
2. We now illustrate the possibility of equilibrium total capacity being
higher than Q
∗ at either game. Let a =1 2 , r =1 .2, and b =2 .75, so
that D(r)=1080
275 , Q
∗ =3 , δ = 255




b . Thus, at any equilibrium of the capacity and price game there
are n∗∗ =4ﬁrms, each with one unit of capacity: on the equilibrium path








b , at any equilibrium there are n§ =5active ﬁrms, each with
one unit of capacity. On the equilibrium path every active ﬁrm produces
a
b(n§+1) = 24
33, resulting in P(Q§)=2and πi(q§)=2× 24
33 − 1.2 ≈ 0.2545.
3. Finally, we illustrate the possibility of the “competitive” outcome
emerging in the capacity and price game but not in the capacity and quantity
game. Let a =1 3 , r =0 .4, and b =1 ,s ot h a tD(r)=1 2 .6, Q
∗ =1 2 ,a n d
p∗ =1 .I t i sb−r
b ≤ δ < 2
√
br−r
b , hence at any equilibrium of the capacity
and price game there are n =1 2active ﬁrms, each one charging p∗ =1 .O n




b . Therefore, at any equilibrium
of the capacity and quantity game there are n§ =1 9active ﬁrms, each
with one unit of capacity and producing a
b(n§+1) =0 .65; the market price is
P(Q§)=0 .65 and πi(q§)=0 .652 − 0.4=0 .0225. ¦
The theoretical possibility illustrated by the last example above deserves
further consideration. One requisite for the emergence of p∗ at an equilib-
rium of the capacity and price game is that, at q∗,i td o e sn o tp a ya n y
u/ ∈ A∗ to enter. This might be so even if, at q∗∗ -t h ec o n ﬁguration actually
in place if u deviates to qu =1-, the price subgame had a m.s.e., provided
e p∗∗
i e q∗∗
i <r . Turn now to the capacity and quantity game. Note that, at
q∗∗, equilibrium revenue is a2
b(n∗∗+1) > e p∗∗
i e q∗∗
i : in fact, e p∗∗
i e q∗∗
i is the revenue
of the Stackelberg follower when each rival is supplying its unitary capacity,
whereas a2
b(n∗∗+1) is the revenue of the Stackelberg follower when each rival
23is supplying a
b(n∗∗+1) < 1.T h u s , i t m a y b ee p∗∗
i e q∗∗
i <r< a2
b(n∗∗+1):i ns u c h
ac a s e ,q∗ is an equilibrium of the capacity and price game but not of the
capacity and quantity game because, in the latter, at q∗ it pays any u/ ∈ A∗
to deviate to qu =1 .
C. A static capacity and quantity game
In terms of choice variables, any equilibrium outcome of the two-stage ca-
pacity and quantity game is a “capacity and output conﬁguration”, namely,
a z−component vector of capacity and output pairs ((q1, q1),...,(qz,q z)).
It is easy to prove that any (subgame-perfect) equilibrium outcome of the
two-stage capacity and quantity game is an equilibrium of the static game.
Consider any ﬁrm i such that (qi, qi) > (0,0). Over the range [0,qi],q i is
clearly a best response to the rivals’ output. Also, it does not pay any ﬁrm i
(no matter whether (qi, qi) > (0,0) or (qi, qi)=( 0 ,0)) to deviate to a higher
capacity and then eventually adjust output: such a move is unproﬁtable in
the two-stage setting, where the rivals’ output at the equilibrium of the
quantity subgame is nonincreasing in i’s capacity; therefore, since outputs
are strategic substitutes, prospects are even worse in the static game, where
the rivals’ output is taken as given.
On the other hand, the static game may have Nash equilibria that are
not (subgame-perfect) equilibria of the two-stage game. Let b>a 2b/(a +
2b − r)2 ≥ r, as in part (ii.b) of Proposition 2. We already know that any
q§ coupled with qi = a
b(n§+1) for each i ∈ A§ is an equilibrium of the static
game. Further equilibria are identiﬁed as follows. Consider any capacity
and output conﬁguration with n active ﬁrms - where n∗ ≤ n<n § -a n dqi =
a
b(n+1) < qi =1for any i ∈ A. Clearly any i ∈ A has made a best response.
Therefore, for any such conﬁguration to be an equilibrium it must be that
any u/ ∈ A has also made a best response. Note that the best deviation u can
make is the capacity-output pair (qu =1 ,q u = a
2b(n+1)), where a
2b(n+1) < 1
is u’s best output response (with qu > 0) to the rivals’ total output. This
results in Πu = a2




Thus we have this result: if b> a2b
(a+2b−r)2 ≥ r, then any capacity and output






br ] active ﬁrms and
qi = a
b(n+1) < qi =1for any i ∈ A constitutes an equilibrium. Applying
this result to Example 3 on p. 11, it can be checked that any capacity and
output conﬁguration with n ∈ (8,11] active ﬁrms, each with qi =1and
producing qi = 17
2(n+1) is an equilibrium of the capacity and quantity game.
24